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Review Brian W. Shaffer 
IN The Culture of Criticism and the Criticism of Culture, Giles Gunn worries 
the disappearance of a moral dimension in contemporary academic dis 
course. In this 
"excruciatingly intellectualistic age that is so obsessed with 
thought but so suspicious of ideas" (61), Gunn writes, "the question now 
being asked is not whether discrimination or judgment remains the goal of 
critical inquiry, but whether valuational procedures belong in critical dis 
course at all" (ix). For Gunn, however, unlike cultural conservatives such 
as Allan Bloom and E. D. Hirsch, our current "crisis of disbelief" is not 
the product of any "breakdown of conventional moral prescriptions," or 
of a 
"forgetfulness of the sacred." Instead, it reflects a critical climate in 
which justifications for moral reasoning are mistrusted, due to their insti 
tutionalization in ways that strike many as but "subterfuges for the ex 
pression of various kinds of social, cultural, political, and even religious 
privilege" (x). 
In this alternately explicative and polemical study, Gunn maintains that 
only a "pragmatic," "dialogic" and "loosely hermeneutical" mode of 
thinking will enable us to recapture a place for the "moral imagination," 
for a "criticism of life," in the interpretation of culture. To this end, he de 
votes entire chapters, comprising the centerpiece of his book, to considera 
tions of Mikhail Bakhtin, Kenneth Burke and Clifford Geertz ?all figures 
for whom the importance of literary texts consists in "the forms of other 
ness they mediate to us" (68). 
Contrary to this understanding of the aims of critical theory, according 
to Gunn, the currently ascendant deconstructive post structuralism denies 
the properly pragmatic, dialogic and hermeneutic aspects of interpreta 
tion. He places such thinkers as Roland Barthes, Jacques Derrida, Michel 
Foucault and Jacques Lacan in this camp to the extent that all of them 
"turn criticism into a science and then reduce the science of criticism to a 
study of the grammars of discourse that not only delimit but essentially 
constitute cultural experience" (41). Taking Saussure's "linguistic" find 
ings for "metaphysical" ones, these critics, for Gunn, wrongly "lay the 
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problems with discourse at the door of language" (143). For them, be 
cause cultural forms are necessarily "arbitrary constructions that bear little 
or no intrinsic relation to the things to which they refer," "web[s] of arti 
ficial and largely self-serving constructs" (41), the only allowable intellec 
tual mode is "disbelief," the only critical stance, "playful cynicism" (42). 
"Put simply," Gunn charges, deconstructive post structuralism, "accord 
ing to its own testimony, and despite the prolixity of its own practi 
tioners," leaves the cultural critic with little to do (43). 
Gunn's riposte to this "intellectually brilliant" challenge is neither to ig 
nore it nor to deem it a fait accompli, but to turn deconstruction loose 
upon itself, on the one hand, and to answer it with his own brand of criti 
cal inquiry?culled from Bakhtin, Burke, and Geertz 
? on the other. In the 
first instance, Gunn points to the mysterious fact, as Gerald Graff and 
Terry Eagleton have recently done, that the discourse of post structuralism 
survives "the demolition of its own critique," and that "the authority of 
its own rhetorical performance" somehow remains untouched (58). Addi 
tionally, he rightly notes that the self-referential discourse of deconstruc 
tion, even for its salutary evasion of "logocentrism," is inordinately "ego 
centric." "Thus," Gunn holds, "while the language of the discourse is suc 
cessfully subverting everything within it, the voice of the discourse is 
effectively subordinating everything outside it" (58) ?all of which con 
duces to 
"solipsism." 
In the second instance, Gunn pits Mikhail Bakhtin's dialogic model of 
critical discourse against Derrida's "monologic" one. For Russian critic 
Bakhtin, all discourse is "dialogic" due to the fact that every utterance, 
each text, "is always subordinate to context, and every meaning related to 
a larger putative whole in which each has the potential of conditioning, as 
well as being conditioned by, others" (145). Gunn aptly notes that Bakh 
tin would associate Derrida's monologism, no matter how linguistically 
subversive, with authority and dogmatism?with the "artificial and self 
authenticating constraints of some system of understanding" (59). Fur 
ther, Bakhtin would counter Derrida's sense of language as "the prison 
house of thought and the distorting mirror of experience" by insisting 
that it is only so when "employed in a discourse that is monologic, totali 
tarian, closed" (144). In this way, for Gunn, Bakhtin celebrates those vir 
tues Derrida ultimately denies: pluralism and alterity. 
Like Bakhtin, American critic Kenneth Burke views art as "a type of 
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oppositional activity" whose disruptive voice seeks to "undermine any one 
rigid scheme of living" (75). Concerned with the relationship between dis 
course and action, between hermeneutics and power, Burke is for Gunn a 
pragmatic cultural critic who uses comedy as an instrument of interpreta 
tion and social change. Burke's "comic realism" Gunn maintains, "is 
founded on the belief that insight... is most often afforded by improbable 
juxtapositions and unlikely, often outrageous, comparisons" (80) ?what 
Burke calls 
"perspectives by incongruity." Burke further shares Bakhtin's 
penchant for the comic in literature, believing that its innate cultural irrev 
erence, what Bakhtin calls its 
"Carnivalesque" nature, guards admirably 
against aesthetic (and by extension ideological) codification and rigidity. 
As Gunn notes, for Burke comedy "remains a cure-all because it does not 
rest in its own realizations but rather contains the seeds of its own coun 
terstatements within itself" (86). 
American anthropologist Clifford Geertz's "hermeneutic" understand 
ing is also seen as a helpful corrective to much prevailing critical thinking: 
"instead of regarding signs as assertions to be deconstructed, codes to be 
deciphered, or messages to be demystified, Geertz wants to conceive of 
them as idioms to be interpreted, texts to be read" (108). Resisting those 
theories "of art and culture that attempt to isolate them from the practical 
contexts that give them life" (99), Geertz emphasizes "context" as much 
as 
"text," visualizing artist, audience and aesthetic form alike as all "part 
of a collective experience that considerably transcends them" (108). In this 
way, for Gunn, Geertz's broadly cultural view of art counters the post 
Flaubertian conception of it as purely stylistic, autotelic and, hence, de 
finable in aesthetic terms alone. As Geertz himself notes, "one can no 
more understand aesthetic objects as concatenations of pure form than one 
can understand speech as a parade of syntactic variations, or myth as a set 
of structural transformations" (108). 
Other chapters of The Culture of Criticism and the Criticism of Culture en 
gage such topics as the American Studies movement and the relation of re 
ligion and literature; but it is fundamentally to the exposure of an imbal 
ance in cultural criticism and to an attempt at redressing this imbalance 
that the heart of the book is dedicated. By terming his own "hermeneutics 
of replenishment" an "alternative" to rather than a "replacement" for the 
prevailing "hermeneutics of suspicion," Gunn is true to the spirit of his 
triumvirate of mentors who allow for, even encourage, the coexistence of 
173 
contraries and the engagement with otherness. 
Whether or not one is in sympathy with the approach to cultural inves 
tigation promoted here, Gunn's book has much to recommend it. For one 
thing, this subtle yet lucid work demonstrates that all of our interpreta 
tions, whether for the purposes of remythologizing or demythologizing, 
deciphering or deconstructing, are inevitably "forms of prejudice," and 
that we must therefore attend to where these prejudices will lead us, and 
not 
merely to their presuppositions. Further, Gunn's therapeutic intellec 
tual history usefully resurrects the category of "experience," long banished 
from the criticism of culture by the category of "language," in order to ex 
pound a sense of criticism as "an exploration of the possibilities and limita 
tions life reveals when viewed from within the work's own felt scheme of 
values," and not merely as a "measurement of the work's fulfiflllment of 
its own conditions for being" (25). While opponents of this orientation 
will accuse it of raising, more than settling, important questions about 
twentieth-century critical discourse, and of being retrograde in its resis 
tance to prevailing intellectual habits?in this case, to the pseudo-formal 
ist premises and self-cancelling practices of deconstruct ion, all but taken 
for granted by many?it is precisely as a cogent reexamination of and 
challenge to them that Gunn's study is most significant. It accomplishes 
what John Dewey would have the most productive acts of cultural self 
reflection do: 
We cannot permamently divest ourselves of the intellectual 
habits we take on and wear when we assimilate the culture of 
our own time and place. But intelligent furthering of culture 
demands that we take some of them off, that we inspect them 
critically to see what they are made of and what wearing them 
does to us (73). 
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